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Abstract—SQL injection attacks (SQLIA) still remain one of
the most commonly occurring and exploited vulnerabilities. A
considerable amount of research concerning SQLIA mitigation
techniques has been conducted with the primary resulting solu-
tion requiring developers to code defensively. Although, defensive
coding is a valid solution, the current market demand for websites
is being filled by inexperienced developers with little knowledge of
secure development practices. Unlike the successful case of ASLR,
no SQLIA runtime mitigation technique has moved from research
to enterprise use. This paper presents an in-depth analysis and
classification, based on Formal Concept Analysis, of the 10 major
SQLIA runtime mitigation techniques. Based on this analysis,
one technique was identified that shows the greatest potential
for transition to enterprise use. This analysis also serves as an
enhanced SQLIA mitigation classification system. Future work
includes plans to move the selected SQLIA runtime mitigation
technique closer to enterprise use.
Index Terms—SQL; injection, web;
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past 15 years, the number of websites has grown
from 29 million in 2001 to more than one billion in 2016
[1]. At the beginning of the 21st century the web, known as
Web 1.0, consisted of websites that were static pages. Around
2002, Web 2.0 was created and with it came new ideas for
exchanging dynamic information. Web 2.0 allows developers
to quickly and easily create new dynamic web applications
that utilize services and data, stored in back-end databases.
Websites with back-end databases are often susceptible to
web vulnerabilities, in particular Structured Query Language
(SQL) Injection Attacks (SQLIAs). Over the past 15 years
SQLIAs have been actively studied, with various solutions
having been proposed; however, no one solution has solved
the problem of combating SQLIAs.
Every three years, starting in 2004, the Open Web Appli-
cation Security Project (OWASP) [2], [3] has published the
Top 10 list of web vulnerabilities. In 2004, SQL injection
was number six, in 2007, it was number two, and for 2010
and 2013, it remains the number one security risk facing
organizations.
Fifteen years ago, Web 1.0 statically linked web pages
were typically created by experienced web developers [4].
As Internet usage grew the demand for more dynamic con-
tent also grew. With the explosive growth the demand for
websites caused a transition from experienced developers to
an expanded base of developers with limited knowledge of
programming or secure development techniques [5].
Web vulnerability through SQL injection remains a prob-
lem for three equally important reasons. First the web is a
complicated intertwined set of web pages with millions of
lines of unvalidated and unsanitized code. It is simply not
cost effective to rewrite millions of lines of code to properly
secure it. Second, if an inexperienced developer does not
understand SQLIAs, then preventative techniques will not be
properly coded into their applications. Third, simple open-
source and free tools that can be applied to the millions
of lines of insecure code and be used without developer
interaction has only been developed in research and has not
transitioned to enterprise use. What is urgently needed is a
runtime environment that requires little to no programmer
involvement, yet still detects a majority of SQLIAs. This type
of approach has already been implemented with other security
vulnerabilities. A good example is the mitigation of most, but
not all, buffer overflow attacks with tools such as StackGuard
or Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR), where both
techniques helped raise the security barrier, without requiring
major code modifications.
This paper presents an analysis and classification system for
SQL injection runtime mitigation techniques. This analysis is
based on Formal Concept Analysis (FCA), and it also serves
as a formal classification system. The goal is to identify, from
all the researched mitigation techniques, which one mitigation
technique is the best candidate for technology transfer into
the enterprise. Section 2 explains why SQL injection attacks
remain a problem. Section 3 discusses a limited set of pre-
viously research SQL injection mitigation techniques. Section
4 describes the current commercial SQL injection mitigation
techniques. Section 5 explains the selection of the mitigation
techniques. Section 6 describes the Formal Concept Analysis
background. Section 7 describes the structured analysis based
on the FCA. Section 8 presents related work including the
prior survey papers. Section 9 presents the conclusion. Section
10 presents future work.
II. WHY SQL INJECTION ATTACKS REMAIN A PROBLEM
Since SQL injection first appeared on the Top 10 list
there have been more than 120 papers written about differ-
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ent classification systems and mitigation techniques. SQLIAs
occur in various ways; however, SQLIAs most commonly
occur when malicious user-provided data is passed through
the web application as SQL commands, and is executed as
SQL code by the backend database. In 2006 Halfond et al. [6]
characterized seven types of SQLIAs, based on the goal and
the intent of the attacker. Those seven types are tautologies,
incorrect queries, union query, piggy-backed queries, stored
procedures, inference, and alternate encoding.
Others have extended Halfond’s et al. work. Since SQLIAs
are initiated through a web page, in 2009 Seixas et al. [7] iden-
tified and classified the most common security vulnerabilities
in web programming languages. In 2012 Ray and Ligatti [8]
formally defined web applications and code-injection attacks.
In 2013 Shar and Tan [9] broadly classified SQL injection
defenses into three categories, defensive coding, SQL injection
vulnerabilities detection, and SQLIA runtime prevention. Shar
and Tan [9] state, “The best strategy for combating SQL
injection . . . calls for integrating defensive coding practices
with both vulnerability detection and runtime attack prevention
methods.” Defensive coding practices are important; however,
most developers are typically novices, with less than five years
experience (51%), who are self-taught (69%) [5] and most
likely have little to no experience with secure development
techniques. Furthermore, of the approximate 120 different
SQL injection research mitigation techniques, no technique
has technologically transferred to enterprise use.
Shar and Tan’s concept of “. . . combating SQL injection, . . .
with both vulnerability detection and runtime attack prevention
methods [9]” is currently improbable. Secure development
teaching is very important; however, implementing secure
development practices will potentially take years. An imme-
diate solution is needed, specifically a runtime environment,
developed with best solution secure coding techniques, that
requires little to no programmer involvement.
III. SQL INJECTION MITIGATION TECHNIQUES
One of the goals of this research is to present a FCA-based
analysis and classification system for SQL injection runtime
mitigation techniques. To achieve this goal, the following
objectives were identified.
1) Identify the current research on SQLIA from the ACM
digital library and the IEEE Explore digital library.
2) Classify the current research as SQLIA Detection or
SQLIA Prevention as explained in subsection III-A.
3) Identify and select the appropriate mitigation techniques
for FCA-based analysis as explained in subsection III-B.
Based on the identified goal and objectives 120 SQLIA
mitigation technique research papers, spanning the years from
2004 to 2016, were identified.
A. Applied Classification Method
Previous research of SQLIA mitigation techniques, broadly
classified those techniques into two categories; SQLIA Detec-
tion (SQLIAD) and SQLIA Prevention (SQLIAP). Halfond
et al. [6] define prevention techniques as “. . . techniques
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF SQL INJECTION RUNTIME MITIGATION TECHNIQUES
Technique Brief Technique Summary
CANDID [10] CANDID combats SQL injection via obfus-
cation and de-obfuscation of SQL commands.
SQL injection attacks can be detected based
on dynamic verification performed on the
obfuscated queries.
CSSE [11] Context-Sensitive String Evaluation uses a
modified PHP interpreter to track precise
per-character taint information through the
system. A context sensitive analysis is used
to detect and reject queries.
SQLCheck [12] SQLCheck check queries at runtime for con-
formity to a model of expected queries. The
model is expressed as a grammar that will
only accept legal queries. In order to check
queries at runtime a key is used to delimit
user input.
SQLGuard [13] SQLGuard compares the parse tree of the
SQL statement before inclusion of user input
with the SQL statement after inclusion of
user input. The developer must use a special
library.
SQLProb [14] SQLProb extracts user query inputs with a
pairwise alignment algorithm to compare user
queries against legitimate queries. It then uses
a SQL parser to check each extracted input.
The query is only sent to the database if the
user input is syntactically confined.
SQLrand [15] SQLrand provides a proxy server between the
web server and database server is used to
deciphering the received queries. The proxy
server un-randomizes the SQL queries and
then forwards the converted SQL query to the
database server for execution. It also hides
any database server error messages.
WASP [16] WASP uses positive tainting, and tracking
techniques for syntax-aware evaluation of
queries string.
Header Sanitization [17] Header Sanitization sanitizes received vari-
ables inside HTTP header request methods.
The sanitized content is replaced back into
the original header field.
Network Analyzer [18] Network Analyzer builds a detection system
between the attacker and the web server.
This system analyzes headers and payload via
“Deep Packet Inspection” of the packet.
Web Application Web Application analyzes the received vari-
Firewall [19] ables inside HTTP header request methods.
The sanitized content is either rejected or
passed to the SQL engine if no SQL injection
is detected.
that statically identify vulnerabilities in the code, propose a
different development paradigm for applications that generate
SQL queries, or add checks to the application to enforce
defensive coding best practices.” Halfond et al. also define
detection techniques as “. . . techniques that detect attacks
mostly at runtime.” To further clarify, static analysis identifies
vulnerabilities in the code during the development by checking
the source code for vulnerabilities.
Prevention techniques can be further classified into two
categories: static (compile-time) analysis or both static and
runtime analysis. For static analysis the mitigation technique
involves tools to examine the code and identify the potential
SQL injection vulnerabilities. The developer needs to manu-
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ally modify the vulnerable code to fix the vulnerability. For
example, SQLUnitGen by Shin et al. [20] locates vulnera-
bilities though automated testing, which generates test reports
that require the developer to manually correct the vulnerability.
Since the majority of developers are inexperienced and self-
taught with little knowledge about secure coding techniques,
any techniques that include static analysis of code, or static
analysis combined with runtime analysis were not considered.
Tools that are both static analysis and runtime prevention
require an input generator that creates automated test cases.
Those tests are executed against the existing code and are
monitored during execution. The results of the execution
is used to identify previously undiscovered vulnerabilities
and verify the code, and once the vulnerability is detected
the correction requires developer involvement. For example,
Kieyzun et al. created Ardilla [21] primarily for testing PHP
applications before deployment. Ardilla incorporated symbolic
logic execution into randomized test inputs to identify previ-
ously undetected SQL injection vulnerabilities. Ardilla was
also deployed against existing websites where it was able
to identify twenty-three previously unknown SQL injection
vulnerabilities.
B. Mitigation Techniques Selection
If a research technique is to transition to enterprise use,
that technique needs to completely be a runtime technique. Of
the approximate 120 proposed techniques, ten were selected.
Table I displays a brief summary of the 10 techniques, with
these techniques chosen based on the following criteria:
• Possibility to transition from research to enterprise use
• Number of citations
• Limited programmer involvement
• Limited additional resources
• Considered to be only runtime techniques
• Number of times a technique is mentioned in previous
survey papers [6], [9], [22]–[36]
Furthermore, in order to identify which mitigation tech-
niques and characteristics are important for Formal Con-
cept Analysis for SQLIAs, a case study of similar types
of security vulnerabilities was conducted. The most closely
related vulnerability are buffer overflow attack mitigation
techniques. Similar to SQLIAs, buffer overflow attacks can be
easily mitigated by the developer through secure development
techniques; however, buffer overflow vulnerabilities still exist.
Also, SQLIAs mitigation techniques, similar to buffer overflow
mitigation techniques have been actively studied for many
years; however, unlike buffer overflow attack mitigation tech-
niques, SQLIAs techniques have not successfully transitioned
to enterprise use.
IV. COMMERCIAL SQL MITIGATION PRODUCTS
This paper contends that no single SQLIA runtime miti-
gation technique has transitioned from research to enterprise
use. Examining the commercial market for software security
yields a relatively new software product category referred to
as runtime application self-protection (RASP). RASP appears
to be based on research by Halfond et al. [16]; however,
this cannot be confirmed since the enterprise version is a
proprietary commercial product. Known RASP products are
developed and sold by Veracode, Hewlett Packard, and Hdiv
Security.
RASP is built into an application’s runtime environment,
allowing it the capability to control execution. For example,
Hewlett Packard created Application Defender. This RASP
product monitors and analyzes the API calls to the common
core Java libraries [37]. Hdiv Security [38] developed a free,
open source community version of RASP targeted to cus-
tomers who want threat protection with less stringent security
requirements. Hdiv Security uses a Java Web Application
Security Framework to control the information flow between
the server and the client.
RASP seems like a workable solution similar to StackGuard
or ASLR; however, it is not the comprehensive product to
solve the SQLIA problem. First, RASP relies on the com-
bination of the runtime application and the use of security
best practices. Cobb states, “One approach alone will never
be sufficient, so don’t forget the importance of best practices .
. . [37].” Security best practice is very important; however, it is
problematic as previously stated based on the inexperience of
most developers. Second, RASP like other techniques is still
in the infancy of being researched, and is currently mainly
available to large companies. It is estimated that less than 1%
of the commercial web products use RASP [37]. Furthermore,
RASP can be cost prohibitive to smaller companies. Although
Hdiv Security does offer a free open source product it is
limited in its capabilities; however, if a company requires
greater security then there is an associated cost. Finally, RASP
is limited in the development languages, such as Java or .NET.
V. FORMAL CONCEPT ANALYSIS BACKGROUND
Formal Concept Analysis (FCA) is “. . . a mathematical
formalism which analyses the data in a context and attempts
to extract the concepts embodied within that data [39].” FCA
is a method for creating a context hierarchy from a collection
of objects and their properties. Each concept in the hierarchy
represents the set of objects sharing the same values for
a certain set of properties or attributes. A hierarchy is a
mathematical concept where a set is ordered. For example,
the set of integers is one such mathematical hierarchy. For
FCA that ordered set is determined by all objects belonging
to a concept, and by the collection of all attributes shared by
the object [40].
Context [39] is the triplet (G,M, I) where G represents
the objects, M represents the attributes, and I represents the
relationship of objects to the attributes I ⊆ (G×M). Content
is a pair of sets defined as (A ⊆ G,B ⊆M), where A is the
set of all objects that have all the attributes in B. B represents
the set of all attributes that apply to all objects in A.
The context of objects and attributes is constructed as a
two-dimensional array of binary values representing the binary
relations between the objects and the attributes. Table II is
a simple example illustrating the FCA of animals (objects)
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TABLE II
SIMPLE FCA EXAMPLE ILLUSTRATING OBJECT/ATTRIBUTES
RELATIONSHIP
Object Name Land Water Trees
Humans X
Frogs X X
Monkeys X X
Giraffes X
Fish X
Turtles X X
and the locations where the animals live (attributes). The
rows represent the objects (animals) and the columns represent
attributes (the locations).
Concepts are understood as “. . . the basic units of thought
formed in dynamic processes within social and cultural envi-
ronments [40].” Concepts and concept hierarchies, are used to
create a mathematical model that allows a lexical relationship
between objects, attributes, and the relationships of the objects
to the attributes. The lexical relationship indicates that an ob-
ject has an attribute. A lattice is created using the relationship
between objects and attributes and the theory of concepts,
which is rooted in philosophy and psychology. Although, there
are twelve aspects to the theory of concepts, those aspects can
be summarized in the following statements.
• The mathematical notion of a formal context converts to
the logical meaning of a domain of interest based on
object-attribute-relationships.
• The mathematical order-relationship that a formal concept
is less than another formal concept is logically understood
as a subconcept-superconcept-relationship.
• The mathematical derivation of a set of formal attributes
is logically viewed as the identification of all objects
having all attributes of a given attribute collection.
• The labeled line diagram of a concept lattice is logically
considered as a hierarchical network linking nodes with
object names to nodes with attribute names and thereby
establishing conceptual meanings.
• Formal object and attribute implications lead to the
recognition of conceptual dependencies within the given
domain of interest.
The lattice [40] is a visual representation of all objects that
share the given attributes, and the relationship of all attributes
shared by the given objects. Figure 1 illustrates the lattice
generated by the set of concepts illustrated in Table II.
VI. STRUCTURED ANALYSIS OF RUNTIME MITIGATIONS
Structured analysis is defined as the process of studying
a system in order to identify the system’s structure, goals
and purposes, as well as create systems and procedures that
will achieve the structure, goals and purposes in an efficient
manner. As previous stated Formal Concept Analysis is “. . . a
mathematical formalism which analyses the data in a context
and attempts to extract the concepts embodied within that data
[39].” FCA is a method for creating a context hierarchy that
identifies the system’s structure.
Fig. 1. The lattice for the example FCA. Data represented in Table II
.
A. Attribute Selection
The attributes were chosen from a combination of attributes
in prior survey papers and criteria identified in selecting the
10 mitigation techniques. Not all attributes were chosen from
prior survey papers since those attributes did not add value
to the FCA. For example a prior survey paper classified the
SQLIA mitigation techniques based on the ability to generate
test suites for attacks. Since this paper is only considering
SQLIA runtime techniques, the ability to generate test suites
was not considered when selection attributes. To be considered
an attribute from a prior survey paper the attribute had to
appear in at least four survey papers. The attributes chosen
from the most commonly discussed in the survey papers were:
• classification of the technique as SQL prevention
• classification of the technique as SQL detection
• code base modification
• additional infrastructure requirements
• the types of SQL injection attacks for which the technique
would mitigate
Recall the focus of the structured analysis and FCA is to
identify which SQL injection runtime mitigation techniques
would be the best candidates for technology transfer into
the enterprise; therefore, additional attributes needed to be
identified. The identified additional attributes that did not
appear in any prior survey papers included:
• is the technique language specific
• did the implementation require tracking or tainting
• did the implementation utilize the GET or POST refer-
ences
• is the technique open source
• is the technique in active development
• what is the level of required developer involvement
In order to be classified as a runtime technique that could
transition to enterprise use a majority of all attributes must
be met. The attributes that were considered very important
were the SQL injection attack types that the technique would
mitigate. The reason these SQL injection attack types were
classified as very important is because the ultimate goal is to
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CANDID X X X X X
CSSE X X X X X X X X X X
SQLCheck X X X X X X X X X X
SQLGuard X X X X X X X X X X
SQLProb X X X X X X X X X X
SQLrand X X X X X X X X X
WASP X X X X X X X X X X
Header
Sanitization X X X X X X X X
Network
Analyzer X X X X X X X X
Web App
Firewall X X X X X X X X
move a product forward raising the security barrier similar to
ASLR where SQL injection attacks can be mitigated without
developer involvement. Table III illustrates the relationship
between the mitigation techniques (objects) and the analysis of
each technique (attributes). The attributes includes a mapping
of the mitigation techniques to the types of SQL injection and
are denoted by the asterisk (*).
B. Lattice Creation
The free open source software Concept Explorer developed
by Sergey Yevtushenko [41] was used to construct a two-
dimensional array structure. This two-dimensional array struc-
ture is a binary structure represented with ones and zeros, a
zero is represented by a blank and a one is represented by
a check mark. The objects appear as individual rows and the
columns are the individual attributes. The illustration of the
objects and attributes is illustrated in Table III.
Using the Concept Explorer software, the two-dimensional
array of objects, as mapped to the attributes, was created.
The rules are generated by the software which is the set of
formal attributes as the identification of all objects having all
attributes of a given attribute collection. The rules are listed
as antecedents, which precedes the consequence. The rules
are based on a percentage of the antecedent supporting the
consequence.
C. Reading the Lattice
A concept lattice is uniquely determined by its formal
context, meaning every structural property can be read based
on the incidence relation. An incidence relation is defined
as the binary relationship between different types of objects,
captured by the idea being expressed. For example “a point lies
on a line” is an incidence relationship. For FCA lattices the
binary relationship is derived from the binary table. Table III
clearly illustrates the relationship expressed in the full lattice.
Figure 3 illustrates the lattice derived for every structural
property based on the incidence relation.
Fig. 2. The Formal Concept Analysis lattice that illustrates the relationship
for all objects that contain the attribute GET/POST.
To better understand the lattice and the incidence relations
the reader has the option of selecting a single node for
any attribute. Selecting such a node will produce a high-
lighted lattice of the incidence relation of that attribute to
the corresponding objects that use that attribute. Figure 2
illustrates the attributes and objects that contain the character-
istic GET/POST. The characteristic GET or POST represents
the two methods Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) uses
for a request-response between a client and the server. The
reader that clicked on the GET/POST node would expect the
path to only proceed down towards the bottom of the lattice;
however this is often not the case. Recall that every structural
property is based on the incidence relation. In Figure 2 the
lattice not only proceeds down it also proceeds up. The lattice
also proceeds through the attribute logically incorrect to the
attribute at the top of the lattice tautology. This relation is
based on the objects identified, CSSE, Header Sanitization,
Web Application Firewall, and SQL Check; all have the same
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Fig. 3. The lattice for the Formal Concept Analysis
attributes in common including the GET/POST attribute. In
order to understand any incidence relations the reader needs
to click on any attribute node.
One of the contributions of this paper is identifying the
potential runtime mitigation techniques that can be moved
to enterprise use. Examining Table III it would appear that
SQL Check, SQL Guard, SQL Prob and WASP could all be
selected based on the number of SQLIA attack types each
one mitigates. SQL Prob combats all the attack types, while
SQL Check, SQL Guard and WASP combat all but stored
procedures. Since four mitigation techniques cannot all be
the best candidates for technology transfer into the enterprise,
other incidence relationships must be examined. One of the
objectives of this paper is identifying techniques that do not
require developer involvement. Selecting high programmer
involvement (Hi Prgm Involve) within the lattice would illus-
trate that SQL Check, SQL Guard and SQL Prob all have
high developer involvement for defensively coding against
the SQLIAs, while WASP does not share this characteristic.
High developer involvement is problematic based on the large
number of inexperienced developers. From this comprehensive
analysis this paper concludes that WASP is the best candidate
tool for evolving into the enterprise. Figure 4 illustrates the
incidence relation between the attributes and the technique
WASP.
VII. RELATED WORK
This section describes related work on other classifications
of SQLIA mitigation techniques, in addition to the 120 re-
search papers there were 16 papers that were classified as
survey papers. To be classified as a survey paper, the contents
of the paper had to include the types of SQL injection attacks,
the types of vulnerabilities and include an analysis of other
mitigation techniques. Since many mitigation technique papers
include a summary of the SQL injection types, the summary
portion of the paper had to encompass at least one half of the
paper.
These 16 papers can be loosely grouped into three cate-
gories: papers that classify the mitigation technique to the
seven SQLIA types, papers that discuss the strengths and
weaknesses of each mitigation technique, including whether
the technique is defensive and/or preventive, and papers that
discuss the classification of SQLIAs with an analysis of
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Fig. 4. The Formal Concept Analysis lattice that illustrates WASP [16] is the
mitigation technique that should be moved to market.
the risks associated with each attack. Table IV displays the
classification of each survey paper. The summary of each paper
is as follows:
Amirtahmasebi et al. [22] review the defense mechanisms
for six mitigation techniques by discussing very specific details
of the defense technique including which SQL injection type
the technique protects.
Grupta et al. [23] proposes a classification of the defense
techniques of the static analysis based approaches. This survey
paper explores eleven techniques from 2005 through 2012.
Halfond et al. [6] classifies the SQL injection attack types.
These attack types became the standard attack types papers
cite. In this survey paper 17 SQLIA mitigation techniques
are compared to the SQL injection attack type, including a
classification of the technique as a detection or prevention
technique. This paper also includes additional information
about modifying the code base and additional infrastructure.
Johari and Sharma [24] present a survey of fourteen pre-
vention techniques that are either SQL injection prevention
techniques or cross site scripting prevention techniques. This
paper presents a description of each technique. The authors
state this “. . . should not excuse developers from applying
preventive coding techniques . . .”
Kaur and Kour [25] identify and analyze the various reasons
for SQL injection attacks. The paper presents the attack and
an example of the attack, but does not present individual
mitigation techniques.
Kindy and Pathan’s [27] paper provides a detailed review of
the various types of SQLIAs including an attempt to classify
the individual vulnerabilities into types. These vulnerability
types are mapped to the SQLIA types. This paper describes
13 mitigation techniques, including tables mapping each tech-
nique to SQL prevention or SQL detection technique, and the
SQL injection attack types.
Kumar and Pateriya’s [28] paper provides a review of the
various types of SQLIAs including an example of each type.
The 21 surveyed papers are mapped to the SQLIA types,
TABLE IV
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Amirtahmasebi et al. [22] X 2009
Grupta et al. [23] X 2014
Halfond et al. [6] X 2006
Johari and Sharma [24] X 2012
Kaur and Kour [25] X 2015
Kindy and Pathan [27] X 2011
Kumar and Pateriya [28] X 2012
Junjin [29] X 2009
Mukherjee et al. [30] X 2015
Sadeghian et al. [31] X 2013
Sajjadia and Pour [32] X 2013
Shar and Tan [9] X 2013
Sharma and Jain [33] X 2014
Tajpour et al. [34]–[36] X 2010
including mapping the technique to SQL prevention or SQL
detection technique, and whether, the technique generates a
report.
Junjin [29] proposes an approach for SQL injection vulner-
ability detection; however, one half of the paper is dedicated
to analyzing two other detection techniques. The analysis
includes a description of manual approaches and automated
approaches for prior SQL injection detection.
Mukherjee et al. [30] provides a review of the SQLIA
problem, including the attack type and an example of each
attack type. The paper reviews 17 defensive techniques with
a classification of each technique as either a prevention or
detection technique.
Sadeghian et al. [31] present a review of 15 mitigation
techniques. This paper classifies each mitigation as either a
best coding practice technique, a detection technique, or a
prevention technique.
Sajjadia and Pour [32] provides a taxonomy of prevention
and detection techniques. The paper classifies the SQLIA
based on the vulnerability type. The paper also addresses
prevention techniques as solely static or as hybrid, both static
and runtime. This review of eight techniques classifies each
technique as prevention or detection, and it includes whether
the code base is modified or if there is additional required
information for the developer.
Shar and Tan [9] present an analysis of fifteen SQLIA
defensive techniques. This paper separates each technique into
the categories of defensive coding, detection techniques and
runtime techniques, and it reclassifies prevention as runtime
techniques and detection as static analysis techniques. This
paper states that “Numerous off-the-shelf offerings are useful
for quickly detecting the presence of SQLIVs [SQL injection
vulnerabilities] in websites.” The paper briefly mentions one
runtime technique is being commercialized.
Sharma and Jain’s [33] paper discusses the classification of
SQL injection attacks, including the risk of each attack type.
The paper also classifies the vulnerability of each SQLIA, and
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discusses the anatomy of orderwise injection types. This paper
does not examine any specific defensive technique.
The three papers of Tajpour et al. [34]–[36] present the
definition of SQLIAs, and the different attack types, including
an example of the attack type. The papers discuss 23 mitigation
techniques including mapping the technique to the seven attack
types.
This research differs from the other survey papers specifi-
cally by the analysis and classification system, based on FCA.
None of the 16 survey papers, identified and reported in
this section, analyzed almost all reported SQLIA mitigation
techniques and their classifications. Also no survey paper
discussed which mitigation technique is the best candidate to
transition from research to enterprise use. The main objective
of this research was to not just repeat prior work. This re-
search provided an analysis and classification of most SQLIA
mitigation techniques. This analysis discovered and identified
WASP [16] as the most promising technique to technology
transfer into the enterprise.
VIII. CONCLUSION
SQLIAs are still a problem. This problem has been com-
pounded because most developers are self-taught and inex-
perienced with little to no knowledge of secure software
development techniques. There are many SQLIA mitigation
techniques that have been researched; however, no one tech-
nique has transitioned to enterprise use. A tool similar to
StackGuard or ASLR needs to be implemented in such a
manner that it can be utilized without developer involvement.
A detailed analysis of all the techniques and the characteristics
of the techniques was developed. Based on all the techniques,
a classification system was created, and structured Formal
Concept Analysis was applied to identify WASP as the best
candidate to technology transfer into the enterprise.
IX. FUTURE WORK
Future work includes plans to technologically transfer the
one identified SQLIA runtime mitigation techniques closer to
enterprise use, by providing an analysis of the current state of
the technique.
In order to better understand current secure development
practices a survey of the top 10 free web development sites will
be conducted. Most free websites allow the user to produce
dynamic web pages without knowledge of web programming.
Most of these sites contain drag-and-drop tools to aid in
the website creation. The survey will include how each free
website mitigates SQLIAs, if at all.
Future work includes plans to analyze the possibility of
merging WASP with current Open Source Web Application
Firewalls (WAF) [42]–[45]. WAF is a technique that is worthy
of future research, considering there is little information on
how to create a WAF, how to use a WAF, or how to configure
a WAF. The combination of WASP and WAF includes the
development of a potential market runtime mitigation tech-
nique similar to ASLR, as a single “drop in” module to a web
application firewall.
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